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Neural responses to ingroup and outgroup members' suffering
predict individual differences in costly helping
Abstract
Little is known about the neurobiological mechanisms underlying prosocial decisions and how they are
modulated by social factors such as perceived group membership. The present study investigates the
neural processes preceding the willingness to engage in costly helping toward ingroup and outgroup
members. Soccer fans witnessed a fan of their favorite team (ingroup member) or of a rival team
(outgroup member) experience pain. They were subsequently able to choose to help the other by
enduring physical pain themselves to reduce the other's pain. Helping the ingroup member was best
predicted by anterior insula activation when seeing him suffer and by associated self-reports of empathic
concern. In contrast, not helping the outgroup member was best predicted by nucleus accumbens
activation and the degree of negative evaluation of the other. We conclude that empathy-related insula
activation can motivate costly helping, whereas an antagonistic signal in nucleus accumbens reduces the
propensity to help.
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 Summary 
Little is known about the neurobiological mechanisms underlying prosocial decisions 
and how they are modulated by social factors such as perceived group membership. The 
present study investigates the neural processes preceding the willingness to engage in costly 
helping towards ingroup and outgroup members. Soccer fans witnessed a fan of their favorite 
team (ingroup member) or of a rival team (outgroup member) experience pain. They were 
subsequently able to choose to help the other by enduring physical pain themselves to reduce 
the other’s pain. Helping the ingroup member was best predicted by anterior insula activation 
when seeing him suffer and by associated self-reports of empathic concern. In contrast, not 
helping the outgroup member was best predicted by nucleus accumbens activation and the 
degree of negative evaluation of the other. We conclude that empathy-related insula activation 
can motivate costly helping, whereas an antagonistic signal in nucleus accumbens reduces the 
propensity to help.  
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Highlights 
• Empathy-related brain responses in anterior insula predict costly helping.  
• Helping in- and outgroup members is predicted by distinct neural responses.  
• Brain responses predict behavior towards outgroup members better than self-reports. 
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Introduction 
For centuries, the question of whether human nature is fundamentally good or bad has 
been at the heart of controversial debates in philosophy, politics, and science. Behavioral 
social science research has investigated the conditions under which people behave in a 
prosocial manner (reviewed in (Dovidio et al., 2006;Penner et al., 2005)). However, very little 
is known about the neurobiological mechanisms underlying prosocial decisions and how they 
are modulated by social factors such as perceived group membership.  
One intriguing outcome of behavioral social science work is the claim that an altruistic 
motivation, directed toward the ultimate goal of increasing the welfare of a person in need, is 
evoked by empathy, also known as the empathy-altruism hypothesis (Batson, 1991). 
Moreover, a number of studies have investigated whether and how prosocial behavior is 
affected by social factors such as group membership (Levine et al., 2005;Stürmer et al., 
2005;Stürmer et al., 2006). The empirical evidence is mixed. Some studies have shown that 
people are more likely to help an ingroup member than an outgroup member in similar need 
(e.g., Levine et al., 2005), referred to as “parochial altruism” (De Dreu et al., 2010). However, 
other studies did not find reliable differences in helping across groups (e.g., Stürmer et al., 
2006). One possible explanation for these inconsistent results is that the decision to help is not 
only influenced by group membership, but also by the potential helper’s attitude toward the 
ingroup or outgroup member. A positive evaluation of the other has been found to increase 
expressed empathic concern, which should increase the likelihood of helping to relieve the 
empathy-inducing need (Batson et al., 2007; Coke et al., 1978; Dovidio et al., 1990). Ingroup 
members tend to be evaluated more positively than outgroup members, which should lead to 
higher empathic concern for their suffering and increase the motivation to help. In contrast, 
the more negative evaluation of outgroup members should result in less empathic concern, 
decreasing helping motivation. Consistent with the findings of Lanzetta and Englis (1989), 
subjects may even take pleasure in the outgroup member’s suffering. However, if an outgroup 
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member is evaluated positively, “parochial altruism” should be undermined. Taken together, 
there is a large body of behavioral work focusing on the empathy-altruism hypothesis, and 
inconsistent findings regarding models of parochial altruism. However, the neural factors 
associated with prosocial decisions and their modulation by perceived group membership 
have not yet been investigated. 
Recent fMRI studies in social neuroscience have started to identify brain networks 
involved in empathy and their modulation (for reviews, see (Decety and Lamm, 2006; Hein 
and Singer, 2008; Singer and Lamm, 2009). Most of these studies have focused on measuring 
brain signals elicited when participants are observing other people suffering pain (Akitsuki 
and Decety, 2009; Benuzzi et al., 2008; Cheng et al., 2007; Jackson et al., 2005; Lamm et al., 
2007a; Lamm et al., 2007b; Saarela et al., 2007; Singer et al., 2004; Singer et al., 2006; Singer 
et al., 2008). The comparison of brain activation elicited in participants experiencing pain and 
that elicited when they merely observe others experiencing pain showed shared activations in 
affective regions of the pain matrix, that is, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and anterior 
insula (AI), which were related to self-report measures of empathy (reviewed in (Singer and 
Lamm, 2009). Furthermore, several recent studies have focused on identifying factors that 
modulate these empathy-related brain responses (Bird et al., 2009; Cheng et al., 2007; Lamm 
et al., 2007a; Singer et al., 2006). Contextual appraisal of the situation (Lamm et al., 2007a) 
and person characteristics such as alexithymia (a deficit in understanding one’s own emotions, 
Bird et al., 2009) and experience with pain (Cheng et al., 2007) have been found to modulate 
empathy-related brain responses in AI and ACC. Particularly relevant for the current study, 
Singer and colleagues (Singer et al., 2006) found that male participants who perceived the 
suffering person as being unfair in a monetary exchange game showed nucleus accumbens 
(NAcc) activation associated with their expressed desire for revenge instead of anterior insula 
activation related to empathy, suggesting that two antagonistic motivational systems compete 
with each other. However, it is unknown whether this observed brain activation pattern can be 
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extended to another domain such as perceived group membership of others and how these 
antagonistic brain signals relate to actual behavior, such as engagement in prosocial behavior. 
Here, we investigate whether brain responses elicited by witnessing another suffering pain are 
modulated by perceived group membership and how these brain responses are related to the 
prediction of costly helping − or a lack of helping − towards ingroup- and outgroup members. 
More specifically, we hypothesized that individual differences in empathy-related 
brain activation in AI and ACC elicited when witnessing another suffering pain should predict 
differences in subsequent costly helping. Specifically, ingroup favoritism in helping should be 
linked to the difference in empathy-related brain responses when viewing an ingroup versus 
outgroup member in pain. Based on previous findings (Singer et al., 2006), we further 
predicted a reduction in empathy-related brain responses in the core empathy-related network 
and an increase in NAcc activation when participants see an outgroup instead of an ingroup 
member in pain. Furthermore, participants who see the outgroup member suffering pain and 
show activation in NAcc instead of empathy-related brain regions should show a decreased 
tendency to help the outgroup member later on. Finally, we aimed to compare the relative 
contributions of self-reports and brain measures to the prediction of helping the ingroup and 
outgroup member. 
Results 
To test these predictions, we used a natural group manipulation (fans of different 
soccer teams) and an fMRI paradigm to assess peoples’ brain responses to others’ suffering 
and costly helping. We recruited male fans of the local soccer team who were paired with a 
fellow fan of the same team (“ingroup confederate”). Both men received wristbands in the 
team color and with the emblem of the local team and met two fans of the local team’s rival 
(“outgroup confederates”), wearing wristbands in the team color and with the emblem of the 
local team’s rival. The two pairs played a competitive soccer quiz game against each other. 
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The experimenter made sure that the ingroup pair always won to prompt uniform positive 
mood.  
Before entering the scanner, the participant and confederates completed the Sport 
Spectator Identification Scale (SSIS; (Wann and Branscombe, 1993)), measuring their 
identification with their soccer team, and an Impression Scale (modified from (Batson et al., 
1988)), on which they separately rated their impression of the ingroup member and the 
outgroup member (see Experimental procedure and Supplementary Appendix for details). 
In Session 1 of the fMRI experiment, we measured participants’ brain responses while 
they received highly, moderately, or mildly painful shocks through electrodes on the backs of 
their hands or while they observed the ingroup or outgroup member, sitting on either side of 
the scanner, receive painful shocks (Singer et al., 2006). The recipient of pain (self, ingroup, 
outgroup) and the intensity of the impending shock were indicated by visual cues (Figure 
1A). While being scanned, participants rated how they felt receiving high, medium, or low 
pain themselves, or observing it in the ingroup and outgroup member on an 9-point rating 
scale (-4 very bad to 4 very good). 
In an independent Session 2, the participant being scanned again observed the ingroup 
and outgroup member in pain. However, this time he was not receiving painful stimulation 
himself, but was to select one of three possible courses of action (Figure 1B). One option was 
to help the ingroup or outgroup member by volunteering to receive half of that person’s pain 
himself, thus reducing the intensity of that person’s pain stimulation by half (“Help” option). 
Such helping behavior was costly for the participant because it resulted in a painful shock. 
The second option was to not help, but to watch a soccer video instead, while the other 
suffered pain (“Watch Video” option). This option offered an attractive alternative to helping 
and distraction from watching the pain administration. The third option was to not help, but to 
watch the other person suffering pain (“Watch Pain” option).  
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After scanning, the participants completed an Empathic Concern Scale, a measure of 
situational empathy (Batson et al., 1997), separately assessing how they felt in the specific 
situation when observing the ingroup member and the outgroup member suffering pain (see 
Experimental Procedure and Supplementary Appendix for details). 
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
Questionnaires.  
Sport Spectator Identification Scale (SSIS). All participants filled in the name of the 
local soccer team as their favorite sports team and reported high scores of identification with 
their team, M = 6.3 (on a Likert scale, ranging from 1, low identification, to 8, high 
identification).  
Impression Scale. We used the Wilcoxon signed rank test to test for differences in the 
average ratings for the ingroup member and the outgroup member. Confirming the success of 
the group manipulation, the average ratings for the ingroup member (M = 3.7, SE = 0.2) on 
the Impression Scale (Batson et al., 1988) were significantly more positive than for the 
outgroup member (M = 6.0, SE = 1.3), Likert scale from 1 (very much) - 9 (not at all), z  = -
3.4, P = 0.001 (Figure S1A). 
Empathic Concern Scale. We submitted the average ratings on the Empathic Concern 
Scale (Batson et al., 1997) for the ingroup and the outgroup member to a Wilcoxon signed 
rank test. The results showed significantly more self-reported empathy for the ingroup 
member (M = 3.6, SE = 0.2) than for the outgroup member (M = 3, SE = 0.3) in pain, z = -2.2, 
P = 0.025.  
Ratings of self and others’ pain in the Scanning Session 1. We only analyzed the data 
of 14 participants because two participants did not provide complete ratings. Confirming the 
results of the Empathic Concern Scale, the high pain of the outgroup member was rated 
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significantly less negative than the high pain of the ingroup member, Wilcoxon Signed Ranks 
test, z = -2.7, P = 0.006. For self and the ingroup member, high pain stimulation was rated as 
significantly more aversive than medium pain stimulation, and medium pain stimulation 
significantly more aversive than low pain stimulation, Wilcoxon Signed Ranks tests, self 
high-medium, z = -2.1, P = 0.002, medium-low, z = -3.5, P < 0.001; ingroup high-medium, z 
= -3.4, P = 0.001, medium-low, z = -3.3, P = 0.001. Pain ratings for the outgroup member 
showed a significant difference between medium and low, z = -2.3, P = 0.021, but not 
between high and medium pain, z < 1 (Figure S1B). 
 
Behavioral results of the fMRI Session 2. 
The behavioral data of fMRI Session 2 were submitted to Wilcoxon signed rank tests. 
The results showed that participants indeed opted to endure pain themselves in order to help 
the other person, but more so for the ingroup, (M = 65.7%, SE = 6.7), than for the outgroup 
member (M = 45.5%, SE = 7.1), z = -3.2, P = 0.001. There was no group effect regarding the 
Watch Video option, ingroup (M = 26%, SE = 5.8); outgroup (M = 30.6%, SE = 6.5), z = -1.4, 
P = 0.15. Participants watched the outgroup member (M = 23.6, SE = 6.8) receive pain more 
frequently than they watched the ingroup member receive pain (M = 8, SE = 3.7), z = -2.8, P = 
0.005 (Figure 1C). However, the Watch Pain option was rarely chosen (only by nine of our 
sixteen participants, with an average of four trials). Therefore, this option was not subjected to 
further analyses.  
Our repeated trial design necessary for fMRI studies might have led to comparisons 
across trials regarding the frequency of ingroup and outgroup helping. As a consequence, 
participants might have felt some obligation to help, in particular to increase the frequency of 
outgroup helping. A potential feeling of obligation should have built up with an increasing 
number of comparisons across trials, reflected in differences between people’s helping 
behavior at the beginning and at the end of the session. To test this assumption, we calculated 
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the frequency with which the participant helped the outgroup member in the first half of 
Session 2 (i.e., the first nine trials per participant) and in the second half of Session 2 (i.e., the 
last nine trials per participant). We then calculated the frequency of helping across all 16 
participants in the two session halves and used the Mann-Whitney test to compare them. The 
results showed no differences between people’s helping behavior in the first and second half 
of Session 2, rendering the possibility unlikely that the helping was primarily based on a 
feeling of obligation; frequency of outgroup helping first half = 67 (out of 144 trials); second 
half = 65 (out of 144 trials), Mann-Whitney U-test, U = 10268, P = 0.88; frequency of 
ingroup helping first half = 106 (out of 144 trials), second half = 84 (out of 144 trials), U = 
10225, P = 0.81. The lack of sequence effects was further confirmed by additional analyses 
contrasting a) the first and last quartiles of Session 2 (five trials each), U = 3195, P = 0.98, 
and b) the first two and the last two trials of Session 2, U = 436, P = 0.82. 
 
fMRI Results. 
To analyze the link between neural responses when observing the other’s suffering in 
Session 1, and helping behavior in Session 2, we used a region of interest (ROI) approach, 
following the guideline for independent ROI analyses (Kriegeskorte et al., 2009). A meta-
analysis of three independent fMRI studies using a similar paradigm as in Session 1 with male 
participants (Bird et al., 2009; Singer et al., 2006; Singer et al., 2008) provided nine ROIs 
including bilateral insula and ACC (see Table S5 for a list of all nine ROIs with center co-
ordinates). For each participant we extracted the beta values averaged over all voxels of each 
of the nine ROIs. In addition, we conducted whole brain multiple regression analyses, 
corrected for multiple comparisons across all nine ROIs (Figure S2). Finally, we also 
performed whole brain analyses (Experimental Procedure, Tables S1 to S4). 
First, we tested the link between brain responses when observing suffering of in- or 
outgroup members in Session 1 and helping in Session 2 collapsed across groups. Individual 
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activation in the left AI when seeing others’ suffering in Session 1 (i.e., the contrast between 
high vs. low pain trials, pooled across the ingroup and outgroup conditions) predicted the total 
number of trials in which people chose to help, r(16) = 0.57, P = 0.019, and correlated 
negatively with the number of trials in which participants opted to watch the video instead of 
helping, r(16) = -0.59, P = 0.015. These results confirm our hypothesis that the magnitude of 
responses in left AI when witnessing another person suffering pain predicts participants’ 
tendency to engage in costly helping later on. Moreover, individual differences in left AI 
activation correlated significantly with individual differences in empathic concern expressed 
on the Empathic Concern Scale (Batson et al., 1997), r(16) = 0.52, P = 0.042, indicating that 
brain responses observed in AI during the empathy condition are indeed linked to self-
reported feelings of empathic concern. No significant correlations were observed in the other 
ROIs (Table S5). Complementary whole brain regression analysis confirmed that left AI was 
the only brain region showing significant correlation with helping behavior and self-reported 
empathic concern (Figure S2). Conjunction analyses between self pain and other pain further 
replicate previous findings of shared activation in left AI elicited both when processing 
nociceptive stimuli in self and empathizing with the pain of others (Tables S2 and S4; for the 
contrast between high versus low self pain and the brain region parametrically modulated by 
high, medium and low pain stimulation see Table S1).  
Next, we tested for differences in brain responses when participants observed the 
ingroup versus outgroup member in pain, and assessed the relationship of these differences to 
ingroup favoritism in helping behavior. The group-averaged activation in left AI was stronger 
when participants saw high versus low pain in the ingroup member (high – low ingroup pain) 
as compared to high versus low pain in the outgroup member (high – low outgroup pain), 
t(15) = 2.9, P = 0.009, (Figure 2A), reflecting an ingroup bias in empathy-related AI brain 
responses. Interestingly, the individual ingroup-outgroup difference in left AI responses (high 
– low ingroup pain versus high – low outgroup pain contrast) predicted the extent of 
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participants’ ingroup favoritism in subsequent costly helping, r(16) = 0.53, P = 0.037, (Figure 
2B). The stronger participants’ AI responses to ingroup pain relative to outgroup pain in 
Session 1, the more they helped the ingroup member, but not the outgroup member in Session 
2. Equivalent analyses in the other ROIs revealed no significant results (Table S5). 
Complementary whole brain analyses confirmed the significant difference between ingroup 
and outgroup pain in left AI but not in other ROIs (Table S3).  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Further, we hypothesized that people might show increased NAcc activation when 
they observe outgroup versus ingroup pain. To test this prediction, we aimed to analyze NAcc 
activation in independent ROIs, unbiased by lateralization. To do so, we first used the ROIs 
provided in an independent previous paper by Knutson et al. (2008) because they allow us to 
define ROIs in bilateral NAcc, in contrast to other relevant studies that only reported 
unilateral NAcc activation (Singer et al., 2006; Takahashi et al., 2009). From these ROIs in 
bilateral NAcc (Knutson et al., 2008), we extracted activations for high - low outgroup and 
ingroup pain (see also complementary ROI analyses below). On average, there was no 
significant group effect in NAcc brain responses, right NAcc, t(15) = 0.81, P = 0.44, left 
NAcc, t(15) = 0.96, P = 0.35.  
Based on previous social science models stressing the important role of subjective 
evaluation (Batson et al., 2007), we tested the possibility that the lack of observed main effect 
in Nacc was driven by individual differences in outgroup impression cancelling each other out 
on group average. For this, we computed an additional analysis correlating individual 
differences in NAcc activation for high – low pain (ingroup; outgroup) with peoples’ 
subjective ratings on the Impression Scale (Batson et al., 1988). And indeed, for the outgroup 
condition, the results showed a significant correlation in right NAcc: The more negative the 
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participants’ impression of the outgroup member, the stronger participants’ brain signal in 
right NAcc when seeing the outgroup member in pain, r(16) = 0.51, P = 0.04 (Figure 3A). 
There was no significant correlation between ingroup impression ratings and high – low 
ingroup pain, r(16) = -0.19, P = 0.47, significantly different from the outgroup correlation, 
ANCOVA, F(1,28) = 5.1, P = 0.031. This reflects invariably positive impression ratings for 
the ingroup member and a general lack of NAcc activation when observing an ingroup 
member suffering pain. 
An equivalent analysis in the left AI revealed that a negative impression of the 
outgroup member was also linked to a decrease in activation in left AI when seeing the 
outgroup member in pain, r(16) = -0.54, P = 0.03 (Figure 3B). Taken together, these results 
indicate that individual NAcc activation and the strength of empathy-related AI responses 
when participants saw an outgroup member in pain, were modulated by their impression of 
the outgroup member. Again, there were no such significant correlations in any of the other 
ROIs (Table S5). Moreover, there was no significant correlation between the impression 
ratings of the ingroup member and left AI activation for ingroup pain, r(16) = -0.04, P = 0.9.  
To test whether NAcc activation in Session 1 predicts outgroup helping in Session 2, 
we computed a correlation between individual beta values of high – low outgroup pain 
activation from bilateral ROIs in the NAcc and the frequency of helping the outgroup 
member. In line with our prediction, we observed a negative correlation between individual 
right NAcc activation in Session 1 and subsequent outgroup helping; the stronger people 
activated right NAcc when observing suffering in the outgroup member, the less likely they 
were to help him, r(16) = -0.59, P = 0.016 (Figure 3C). There was no significant correlation 
in left NAcc, r(16) = -0.10, P = 0.69. 
In complementary analyses, we tested the robustness of effects found in right NAcc 
using different ROIs taken from two other independent studies (Singer et al., 2006; Takahashi 
et al., 2009; see Experimental Procedure for details). Confirming the results of our main 
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analysis with the “Knutson ROIs”, we found a significant negative correlation between right 
NAcc activation when participants were observing the outgroup member in pain in Session 1 
and helping the outgroup member in Session 2, ROI from Singer et al. (2006), r(16) = -0.53, 
P = 0.033; ROI from Takahashi et al. (2009), r(16) = -0.51, P = 0.043, which in turn 
correlated positively with participants’ outgroup ratings on the Impression Scale, ROI from 
Singer et al. (2006), r(16) = 0.52, P = 0.039; ROI from Takahashi et al. (2009), r(16) = 0.5, P 
= 0.048. There were no significant results in left NAcc, correlation with frequency of helping 
the outgroup member, ROI from Singer et al. (2006), r(16) = -0.2, P = 0.45; ROI from 
Takahashi et al. (2009), r(16) = -0.28, P = 0.28, correlation with outgroup impression, ROI 
from Singer et al. (2006), r < 1; ROI from Takahashi et al. (2009), r(16) = 0.15, P = 0.57. 
These results show that we were able to replicate our NAcc results in ROIs from three 
different independent studies, which reflects their robustness. 
 
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
------------------------------- 
In a final integrative step, we sought to compare the relative contributions of assessed 
self-report and brain activation measures to the prediction of costly helping in the ingroup and 
the outgroup condition. To this end, we conducted commonality analyses to assess the unique 
and common variance contributions of neural predictors (activation in AI and NAcc) and self-
report predictors (Empathic Concern Scale and Impression Scale) to explained variance in 
helping towards the ingroup and the outgroup member (see Experimental Procedure for 
details).  
Helping the ingroup member was best predicted by the unique contribution of left AI 
activation when the participant saw the ingroup member in pain (U1 = 0.225 = 22.5% of the 
variance in ingroup helping), the unique contribution of the rating on the Empathic Concern 
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Scale for the ingroup member (U3 = 0.164 = 16.4% of the variance in ingroup helping), both 
P < 0.05, and the shared variance of these two measures (C13 = 0.117 = 11.7% of the 
variance in ingroup helping), P < 0.1 (Table 1a). There were no significant differences in the 
size of the contribution of these components, P > 0.05, value corresponding to the 95% 
confidence interval of the bootstrapping distribution, Δ = 0.12, AI versus Empathic Concern 
scale, Δ = 0.06; AI versus AI & Empathic Concern scale, Δ = 0.11; Empathic Concern scale 
versus AI & Empathic Concern scale, Δ = 0.05 (Experimental Procedure for details). No 
other contributions were significant, all P > 0.3 (Figure S3A).  
In contrast, significant predictors for helping the outgroup member were the unique 
contribution of NAcc activation when the participant saw the outgroup member in pain (U2 = 
0.243 = 24.3% of the variance in outgroup helping), the shared contribution of NAcc 
activation and the ratings on the Impression Scale for the outgroup member (C24 = 0.17 = 
17% of the variance in outgroup helping), both P < 0.05, and the unique contribution of the 
rating on the Impression Scale (U4 = 0.102 = 10.2% of the variance in outgroup helping), P < 
0.1 (Table 1b). No other contributions were significant, Empathic Concern Scale and 
Impression Scale, P > 0.1; all others P > 0.3 (Figure S3B). The unique contribution of NAcc 
activation was significantly greater than that of the Impression Scale, P < 0.05, suggesting 
that peoples’ brain responses in NAcc were better predictors of their future outgroup behavior 
than their self-report measures of outgroup impression, value corresponding to the 95% 
confidence interval of the bootstrapping distribution, Δ = 0.14, NAcc versus Impression scale, 
Δ = 0.15 ; NAcc versus NAcc & impression scale, Δ = 0.07;  Impression scale versus NAcc & 
impression scale, Δ = 0.072 (Experimental Procedure for details). 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
Discussion 
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The goal of our study was to investigate the neurobiological basis of prosocial 
behavior and more specifically of the decision to help a ingroup and outgroup member 
suffering pain. We hypothesized that empathy-related brain activation when witnessing 
others’ suffering pain would predict subsequent helping behavior, and that such empathy-
related responses would mediate the effect of group membership on helping. Further, we 
predicted that participants would show a decreased tendency to help if they responded with 
NAcc activation instead of empathy-related activation to others’ suffering. Finally, we aimed 
to determine the relative contributions of brain responses and self-report measures to the 
prediction of later helping behavior towards the ingroup and the outgroup member.  
Confirming previous results in empathy-for-pain research pointing to a core network, 
consisting of anterior insula and ACC, subserving empathy for pain (for reviews, see (Decety 
and Lamm, 2006;Hein and Singer, 2008;Singer and Lamm, 2009), both our ROI and whole 
brain analyses revealed enhanced activation in AI when participants witnessed others’ pain, 
which was significantly associated with subjective reports. More importantly, and in line with 
previous studies reporting correlations between observed activation in AI and subjective 
affective ratings (Akitsuki, Decety, 2009; Benuzzi et al., 2008; Cheng et al., 2007; Jackson et 
al., 2005; Lamm et al., 2007; Saarela et al., 2007; Singer et al., 2008), activation in AI was 
significantly correlated with subjective state measures of felt empathic concern assessed post 
scan with the Empathic Concern Scale (Batson et al., 1997). This result is in line with 
previous social psychological models claiming that empathic concern, that is, feeling for 
another, motivates helping, in contrast to the so-called feeling of empathic distress or personal 
distress, which is an aversive and self-oriented emotional response to the suffering of others 
that often results in withdrawal behavior motivated by the desire to protect oneself from 
negative emotions (Batson et al., 1983;Eisenberg et al., 1989). 
In contrast to other fMRI studies focusing on empathy for pain, empathy-related 
activation in the present study was observed in left AI only. The lateralization of empathy-
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related brain activation was addressed in a recent paper that analyzed activations in 168 
participants from nine different empathy-for-pain studies (Lamm and Singer, 2010). Formal 
tests of asymmetry based on lateralization indices did not reveal hemispheric asymmetry. 
However, in line with our results, inspection of the thresholded statistical parametric maps 
showed stronger activation in left fronto-insular cortex.  
More importantly, our results showed stronger brain responses in left AI when 
participants witnessed an ingroup member as compared to an outgroup member suffering 
pain. This finding suggests an ingroup bias in empathy-related brain responses in the anterior 
insular cortex, which extends previous studies investigating empathy modulation (Cheng et 
al., 2007;Lamm et al., 2007a;Lamm et al., 2007b;Saarela et al., 2007;Singer et al., 2006) 
(reviewed in (Hein and Singer, 2008)) as well as previous studies investigating the impact of 
group membership on neural correlates of fear (Olsson et al., 2005) and face processing 
(Golby et al., 2001;Lieberman et al., 2005;Van Bavel et al., 2008;Xu et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, we found that witnessing an outgroup member suffering pain elicited activation 
in right NAcc along with a decrease in empathy-related activation in left AI. NAcc is known 
to receive major projection from ascending dopaminergic pathways, which are long known to 
be crucial for reward processing (Schultz, 1986;Schultz, 2000;Schultz, 2002). In social 
contexts, NAcc activation has also been observed when people derive pleasure from the 
misfortune of others (Singer et al., 2006;Takahashi et al., 2009). In the context of these 
findings, the NAcc activation in our study might imply that watching a negatively evaluated 
outgroup member receiving pain was processed in a reward-related manner. 
Extending previous results showing average enhanced NAcc activation in males 
witnessing unfair compared to fair people suffering pain (Singer et al., 2006), we show here 
that NAcc activation is mediated by participants’ social evaluation of the other person. In 
other words, the simple fact that a person is an outgroup member was not sufficient to elicit 
NAcc activation in all subjects while they observed him suffering pain. In order to activate 
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NAcc, the observer needed to have a strong enough negative impression of the suffering 
person. This observation may also help to explain the mixed findings of behavioral studies 
investigating parochial altruism: Sometimes people have indeed been found to be more likely 
to help an ingroup than an outgroup member in similar need (e.g., Levine et al., 2005). 
However, other times no such differences could be observed (e.g., Stürmer et al., 2006). Our 
findings suggest that the decision to help may not only be determined by perceived group 
membership; it might also be influenced by the potential helper’s attitude toward the ingroup 
or outgroup member (see also Batson et al., 2007)). If the only information one has about a 
person in need is group membership, as in Levine et al.’s (2005) research, then group 
membership is likely to determine one’s attitude only − and one’s helping.  If, however, one 
can derive additional information about the other, this additional information may also affect 
one’s evaluation of the person in need and, in turn, one’s likelihood of helping. Even though, 
in the present paradigm, subjects did not know the in- and outgroup members they were 
paired with before, they were still able to form an impression by their mere presence in the 
same waiting and scanner room.  
Most importantly, our study demonstrated that brain responses when seeing others’ 
suffering pain predict actual helping behavior at a later point in time. Empathy-related 
activation in left AI predicted the frequency of later costly helping. The individual extent of 
peoples’ ingroup bias in left AI response was linked to the extent of ingroup favoritism in 
helping behavior. A refusal to help the outgroup member later on was predicted by the 
magnitude of individual NAcc activation in the participant when he saw the outgroup member 
suffering before. Commonality analyses showed that helping the ingroup member was best 
predicted by individual left AI responses and self-report measures on an empathy 
questionnaire, whereas NAcc activation, compared to self-report on a group-impression scale, 
was the best predictor of later behavior towards the outgroup member.  
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Taken together, our findings suggest that the decision to engage in or refrain from 
costly helping may result from the interplay between two competing motivational systems. 
Activation in AI when witnessing a person’s suffering reflect empathy-based motivation and 
increases people’s propensity to help. In contrast, activation in NAcc, reflecting motivation 
counteracting empathy, is associated with letting the other person suffer. Which of the two 
systems is dominant in a concrete helping situation seemed to be determined by the evaluation 
of the suffering person. A positive evaluation elicited empathy-related AI activation, and a 
decrease in NAcc activation, resulting in a greater propensity to help. Such an interpretation is 
in line with recent behavioral evidence which showed a positive relationship between the 
evaluation of a person in need, empathic concern, and helping (Batson et al., 2007). 
Complementary, our results revealed that participants who rated the outgroup member 
negatively showed increased activation in NAcc and a reduction in empathy-related AI 
responses and, as a consequence, helped the outgroup member less. Overall, ingroup members 
were evaluated more positively than outgroup members, resulting in an ingroup bias in 
empathy-related AI responses and ingroup favoritism in helping. Interestingly, however, if the 
outgroup member was evaluated positively, his suffering also elicited an empathy-related AI 
response instead of NAcc activation, and he received help despite his outgroup membership. 
Emphasizing the immediate practical relevance of our findings, this implies that increasing 
empathy in people by, for example, providing them with more information about outgroup 
members can override their callousness towards the suffering of an outgroup member and 
reduce ingroup favoritism in helping behavior with all its detrimental effects in and across 
societies.  
Complementing these findings, our study offers important methodological insights by 
comparing the contributions of brain measures and self-report measures to predicting ingroup 
and outgroup helping. The results of the commonality analyses showed that both brain 
responses and self-reports contribute to the prediction of interindividual differences in costly 
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helping (11.7% for AI & Empathic Concern Scale; 17% for NAcc & Impression Scale). 
However, we also found sizable unique contributions (22.5% for the AI, 16.4% for the 
Empathic Concern Scale, 24.3% for the NAcc, and 10.2% for the Impression Scale), 
suggesting that brain responses in participants witnessing others’ suffering and participants’ 
self-reports capture different aspects of the motivation to help. Brain responses compared to 
self-report measures are probably better indicators of participants’ spontaneous, possibly 
unconscious, emotional responses. Accordingly, they should reflect peoples’ real motivations 
and be unbiased by social desirability effects (Greenwald and Banaji, 1995), which are known 
to affect self-reports in socially sensitive situations such as when outgroup members are 
evaluated (Kawakami et al., 2009). Supporting this view, the unique contribution of NAcc 
activation, as compared to peoples’ self-reported impression of the outgroup member, was 
more powerful in predicting future helping behavior towards the outgroup member. This 
finding suggests that brain responses are particularly useful for predicting peoples’ behavior 
towards a non-preferred other, such as an outgroup member. In contrast to brain responses, 
self-reports require that people reflect on their feelings and thoughts. Thus, they allow for 
more fine-grained distinctions between different feelings and, according to our results, are 
reliable predictors of future helping behavior towards a preferred other, like an ingroup 
member.  
In sum, our study identified two neurobiological processes associated with decisions to 
help or withdraw from prosocial behavior, and provides a neurobiologically informed account 
of ingroup favoritism in prosocial behavior. Furthermore, it demonstrates the reliability of 
imaging data in predicting later behavior, especially in socially sensitive situations such as 
when participants are helping an outgroup member.  
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Experimental Procedure 
Participants and Confederates.  
Participants (16 men; mean age = 29.8, SE = 1.6), recruited from the fan club of a local 
football team, gave informed consent and the study was approved by the Research Ethics 
Committee of Zurich (E-24/2008). We employed three male college students as confederates. 
They posed either as fellow fan of the same football team (ingroup member) or fan of the rival 
football team (outgroup member), counterbalanced across participants. 
Pre-scanning procedure.  
Details about the cover story are provided in the Supplementary Material. After the 
competitive soccer quiz (see above), one of the outgroup confederates was sent away, 
ostensibly to take part in an EEG version of the experiment in another room, and the 
participant, the ingroup confederate, and the remaining outgroup confederate were taken to 
the scanner control room. There, we attached pain electrodes to the dorsum of their left hand. 
Following a standard procedure (Singer et al., 2004;Singer et al., 2006), we determined 
individual thresholds for highly, moderately, and mildly painful sensation, using electrical 
stimulation (monopolar, monophasic, pulse width: 500 ms; frequency: 30 Hz; duration: 500 
ms) from a custom-made stimulator (Compex (Keller et al., 2001)). The experimenter then 
explained that in the first experimental session all three of them would receive highly, 
moderately, or mildly painful stimulation. In the second experimental session, one of the three 
would not receive painful stimulation, but be able to decide whether to influence the painful 
stimulation of the others. The person who would not receive pain in the second session was to 
be determined by chance (viz., the person who drew the shortest match). Holding up three 
partially concealed matches, the experimenter made sure that the two confederates always 
drew first and selected the long matches, leaving the participant the short one.  
Each of the three people had a separate visual display: the participant via back-projection 
from a mirror onto a screen; the two confederates outside the scanner via goggles. This 
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assured that the participant’s ratings and decisions were strictly anonymous. Finally, the three 
men were told that they would not meet after the experiment because the participant in the 
scanner would need to stay longer to complete an anatomical scan. The other two men would 
leave the building before the anatomical scan began. 
 
Questionnaires. 
Impression Scale.  The items assessed participants’ awareness of the other’s ingroup or 
outgroup membership (e.g., How similar to you do you think the person with the white/red 
wristband is?; How much do you think you and this person have in common?; To what extent 
would you use the term “we” to describe yourself and this person?; To what extent do you see 
yourself and this person as part of the same group?), and their evaluation of the ingroup and 
the outgroup member (e.g., How much do you think you might like to interact with this 
person at some future time?; How likeable did you find this person?; Were you to meet this 
person, how likely do you think it is that you would become friends?; see Supplementary 
Appendix). The high internal consistency reliabilities (ingroup, Cronbach’s α = 0.85; 
outgroup, Cronbach’s α = 0.89) showed that the awareness of the other’s group membership 
and personal evaluation of him were strongly correlated. 
While completing the ingroup and outgroup impression scales, the participant was still sitting 
in the control room, separate from the confederates who were already seated in the scanning 
room.  
 
Empathic Concern Scale. The scale assessed the extent to which participants experienced a 
certain affective state on a 7-point scale (e.g. How sympathetic, softhearted, warm, 
compassionate, tender, moved did you feel when you saw the person with the white/red 
wristband receiving highly painful shocks?; internal consistency reliability ingroup, 
Cronbach’s α = 0.91, internal consistency reliability outgroup, Cronbach’s α = 0.93; 
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Supplementary Appendix). It is a subscale of a 20 items emotional response scale ((Batson 
et al., 1997) for details). The other subscale measuring Personal Distress was not used here, 
because our study focused on the relationship between empathy and helping, without a priori 
hypotheses for the impact of personal distress. However, we conducted complementary 
analyses with the Personal Distress scale (Table S5). 
 
Scanning Procedure. 
Session 1. Session 1 was based on a 3x3 factorial design, with the first factor representing 
“intensity of pain stimulation” (low, medium, high) and the second factor representing 
“recipient” (self, ingroup member, outgroup member). The scanning session consisted of 
eighteen blocks with six stimuli: two high pain, two medium pain, and two low pain. One-
third of these blocks included stimulation of the self (participant), one-third stimulation of the 
ingroup member, and one-third stimulation of the outgroup member. Block order and stimulus 
type were pseudo-randomly permuted (repetitions of block type were limited to one and 
stimulus type repetitions to two). In total, there were 12 trials per condition. An example trial 
with timeline is shown in Figure 1A. Each block of pain stimulation was followed by an 8s 
video with soccer scenes, representing the “soccer part” of the paradigm, consistent with the 
cover story (see Supplementary Material). All videos showed beneficial scenes for the local 
soccer team to keep the emotional valence constant and to boost participants’ identification 
with their soccer team.  
 
Session 2. The experimental setup (position of the confederates, pain electrodes) and the 
overall design of the Helping session were comparable to those of the Empathy session. The 
main difference was that now only the ingroup or outgroup member received pain, and only 
two of the pain levels were used − high and low. The participant in the scanner did not receive 
stimulation, but was asked to choose between three decision options: (1) to help the ingroup 
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or outgroup member by enduring half of the pain, (2) not to help and watch a soccer video, or 
(3) not to help and watch the other person endure the pain. 
Session 2 consisted of 18 blocks with four stimuli each (two high pain, two low pain). Half of 
the blocks included stimulation of the ingroup member, half of the outgroup member. Block 
order and stimulus type were pseudo-randomly permuted (repetitions of block type were 
limited to one, and stimulus type repetitions to two). In total, there were 18 trials per 
condition. An example trial with timeline is shown in Figure 1B. Each block of pain 
stimulation was followed by an 8s video with soccer scenes, beneficial for the participant’s 
team. 
If the participant chose the helping option, the pain bar display was shown for 1500 ms 
with the participant’s pain bar rising from the low to the medium level and the other’s 
(ingroup or outgroup member’s) pain bar dropping from the maximal to the medium level, 
followed by a flash and medium pain stimulation for the helper (Figure 1B). Helping was 
only possible in the high pain condition because it would have made no sense to take half of 
the other’s low pain (i.e., not painful) stimulation. Low pain trials were included in Session 2 
because we feared it would be irritating and implausible for the participant to see the others 
invariably facing highly painful shocks. However, the low pain condition was not included in 
the analyses. If the participant chose to watch a video instead of helping, a 6s soccer video 
started with scenes favorable for the participant’s favorite team. The participant knew that 
while he was watching soccer, the ingroup or outgroup member received the highly painful 
shock, which was indicated before in the pain bar display. If the participant opted to watch the 
pain of the ingroup or the outgroup member, the pain bar display appeared for 1500 ms, 
indicating again the level of stimulation the other was to receive, followed by the 1000 ms 
flash. 
Not all decision options were used by all participants. This resulted in a large number 
of empty decision cells across participants, which would considerably reduce the statistical 
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power of any imaging analyses. Taking this into account, and given that the focus of our study 
was to predict helping in the Helping session from brain responses in the independent 
Empathy session, we did not analyze the imaging data from Session 2.  
 
Image acquisition and analysis.  
The experiment was conducted on a 3 Tesla Philips Intera whole body MR Scanner (Philips 
Medical Systems, Best, The Netherlands) at the University Hospital Zurich, equipped with an 
8-channel Philips SENSE head coil. Structural image acquisition consisted of 180 T1–
weighted transversal images (0.75 mm slice thickness). For functional imaging, we used a 
SENSitivity Encoded (SENSE) (Pruessmann et al., 1999) T2*-weighted echo-planar imaging 
sequence with an acceleration factor of 2.0. We acquired thirty-three axial slices covering the 
whole brain with a slice thickness of 3.2 mm; inter-slice gap of 0.3 mm; descended 
acquisition; TR = 2000 ms; TE = 35ms; flip angle = 82°, field of view = 220mm; matrix size 
= 128 × 128. A total of 804 volumes were obtained in Session 1; in Session 2, 616 to 684 
volumes were obtained, depending on the choices made by the participants (e.g., trials in 
which participants chose the Watch Video option were longer than Helping trials). 
 The images were analyzed with SPM5 (Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, 
London, UK), using an event-related model (Josephs et al., 1997). To correct for head 
movements, all functional volumes were realigned to the first volume (Friston et al., 2009) 
spatially normalized to a standard template with a resampled voxel size of 3x3x3 mm, and 
smoothed using a Gaussian kernel with a full width at half maximum (FWHM) of 10 mm (6 
mm at the first level, 8 mm at the second level). To remove low-frequency drifts from the 
data, high pass temporal filtering with a cut-off of 128s was applied. After pre-processing, 
statistical analysis was carried out using the general linear model (Friston et al., 1995). 
Regressors of interest were modeled using a canonical hemodynamic response function 
(HRF) with time derivative, the latter accounting for subject-to-subject and voxel-to-voxel 
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variation in the response peak (Henson et al., 2002). We defined separate regressors from 
each trial onset (presentation of the anticipatory cue) to the offset of the pain bars, covering a 
time window of 2000 ms, and for each pain onset (presentation of the flash) to pain offset, 
covering a time window of 1000 ms. Residual effects of head motion were corrected for by 
including the six estimated motion parameters for each subject as regressor of no interest in 
the design matrix. Contrast images were calculated by applying appropriate linear contrasts to 
the parameter estimates for the regressor of each event. For whole brain analyses (see 
Supplementary Data) these contrast images were entered into one-sample t-tests across the 
16 participants to initiate random effect group analyses (Penny and Holmes, 2004).  
 
Region of interest (ROI) analyses. In our main analyses, we used a region of interest (ROI) 
approach. Using the Marsbar toolbox (Brett et al., 2009), independent ROIs were defined in 
nine brain regions, based on activations (P uncorrected < 0.001) from a meta-analysis of 
previous studies with similar empathy-for-pain paradigms (Bird et al., 2009; Singer et al., 
2006; Singer et al., 2008) (Table S5). Moreover, we defined ROIs in bilateral nucleus 
accumbens (NAcc) based on three different independent previous studies: a) Knutson et al. 
(2008) with 10 12 -2 and -10 12 -2 as center coordinates (8 mm diametrical spheres), b) 
Singer et al. (2006) with -9 15 -9 as center coordinate (from the original activation map), and 
its mirror image (center coordinate: 9 15 -9), c) Takahashi et al (2009) with 8 mm diametrical 
spheres around the center coordinate reported in the paper (-14 2 -12) and its mirror image 
(center coordinate, 14 2 -12).We extracted individual beta values, averaged over all voxels of 
the ROIs. Correlation results are reported with a significance level of P < 0.05.  
 
Commonality analysis. We conducted commonality analyses (Nimon et al., 2008) to assess 
the unique and common variance contributions of the brain and self-report measures 
considered in our study to the prediction of helping behavior. We included four predictor 
 26
variables for ingroup helping and four predictor variables for outgroup helping; predictor 1 = 
each participant’s beta values in left AI when seeing high – low ingroup/outgroup pain, 
predictor 2 = each participant’s beta values in right NAcc when seeing high – low 
ingroup/outgroup pain, predictor 3 = each participant’s mean score for the ingroup/outgroup 
member on the Empathic Concern Scale (Batson et al., 1997), predictor 4 = each participant’s 
mean score for the ingroup/outgroup member on the Impression Scale (Batson et al., 1988). In 
a first step, R-squared coefficients were calculated for the correlation of ingroup/outgroup 
helping with each predictor, and all possible combinations of predictors. The results are 
presented in the Table S6.  
In a second step, we conducted two commonality analyses, one including all R-square values 
of ingroup-related predictors of ingroup helping (i.e., values in the left column of Table S6), 
and one with all R-square values of outgroup-related predictors of outgroup helping (i.e., 
values in the right column of Table S6). Using Formula 1, we computed the unique (U) and 
common (C) variance contribution of the predictors to the total explained variance of ingroup 
and outgroup helping. The results are reported in Table 1.  
Note that negative commonalities probably reflect suppression effects, or occur when 
some of the correlations among predictors are positive and others are negative (Pedazur, 
1997). However, given that none of the negative variance contributions reached significance, 
we refrain from interpreting them. 
Formula 1. Computation of commonality coefficients with four predictors. 
U1 = -R2234+R21234 
 U2 = -R2134+R21234 
U3 = -R2124+R21234 
U4 = -R2123+R21234 
C12 = -R234+R2134+R2234-R21234 
C13 = -R224+R2124+R2234-R21234 
C14 = -R223+R2123+R2234-R21234 
C23 = -R214+R2124+R2134-R21234 
C24 = -R213+R2123+R2134-R21234 
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C34 = -R212+R2123+R2124-R21234 
C123 = -R24+R214+R224+R234-R2124-R2134-R2234+R21234 
C124 = -R23+R213+R223+R234-R2123-R2134-R2234+R21234 
C134 = -R22+R212+R223+R224-R2123-R2124-R2234+R21234 
C234 = -R21+R212+R213+R214-R2123-R2124-R2134+R21234 
C1234 = R21+R22+R23+R24-R212-R213-R214-R223-R224-R234+R2123+R2124+R2134+R2234-R21234 
 
In a third step, we tested the significance of the observed variance contributions 
against a random baseline (Horn, 1965). As the random baseline we used the mean of the 
variance contributions from 5000 commonality analyses, computed with 5000 random 
permutations of each of the four ingroup/outgroup predictors (see Figure S3). 
 In a fourth step, we used a bootstrapping procedure to statistically test for differences 
between variance contributions, which, in step three, were significant on the 90% level (see 
Figure S3). We created 5000 pseudo-samples with 16 subjects each, by sampling with 
replacement from our original sample. Each bootstrap pseudo-sample was submitted to the 
commonality analysis described above, and the differences between the respective variance 
components were calculated. The significance of these differences was tested with symmetric 
basic bootstrap confidence intervals (Davison and Hinkley, 1997). We corrected for multiple 
comparisons using a stepwise multiple testing procedure (Romano and Wolf, 2005). In short, 
we computed the distribution of the maximum differences between the individual conditions 
and used the value corresponding to the 95% confidence interval. 
 
Whole brain analyses of main effects, parametric pain modulation, conjunction analyses.  
The results of the whole brain analyses are reported in Tables S1 to S4. All whole brain 
results are reported with a threshold of P uncorrected < 0.001. Activations which were also 
significant at P < 0.05 FDR correction are marked correspondingly. The anatomical 
localizations of the functional activations were identified using an anatomical atlas 
(Duvernoy, 1999) and probabilistic cytoarchitectonical maps (Eickhoff et al., 2007) 
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implemented in the SPM toolbox. Subregions in cingulate cortex were classified based on a 
recent review of cingulate cytoarchitecture and functions (Vogt, 2005). Analyses contain A) 
the contrast between high and low self pain (high – low self pain), and the parametrical 
modulation by high, medium, and low pain stimuli (Table S1), B) conjunction analyses, 
equivalent to a masking procedure (Friston et al., 2005), for high – low pain trials in self and 
others, pooled across the ingroup and outgroup conditions (Table S2a), and separately for 
high – low self pain trials and high – low ingroup pain trials (Table S2b) and high – low self 
pain trials and high – low outgroup pain trials (Table S2c). C) the contrast between observing 
high and low pain in the ingroup member and observing high and low pain in the outgroup 
member (high – low ingroup pain vs. high – low outgroup pain) (Table S3a), the contrast 
between observing high and low pain in the ingroup member (high – low ingroup pain) 
(Table S3b), and the contrast between observing high and low pain in the outgroup member 
(high – low outgroup pain) (Table S3c), D) the contrast between observing high and low pain 
pooled across ingroup and outgroup conditions ((high – low ingroup pain) and (high – low 
outgroup pain)) (Table S4). 
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Figure captions 
Figure 1. A) Example trial of Session 1. The participant received pain stimulation himself or 
saw the ingroup or outgroup member in pain. After each trial, participants indicated how they 
felt receiving pain themselves or seeing the ingroup or outgroup member in pain on a scale 
from -4 (very bad) to +4 (very good). B) Example trial of Session 2. The scanned participant 
was not assigned pain, but knew that the ingroup or the outgroup member would receive 
highly painful stimulation. The participant could decide between taking half of the other’s 
pain on himself (help), watching a soccer video instead of helping, knowing that the other 
would receive pain (watch video), or watching the other receive pain (watch pain).  
C) Behavioral results of Session 2. Error bars are standard errors. 
 
Figure 2. Ingroup bias in empathy-related brain activation in anterior insula, and its relation 
to behavioral differences in helping ingroup compared to outgroup members. A) Group-
averaged beta values extracted from an independent ROI in left anterior insula (AI) when 
subjects witnessed high compared to low pain in the ingroup member (blue) and high 
compared to low pain in the outgroup member (red) in Session 1. Error bars represent 
standard errors. B) Correlation between individual parameter estimates extracted from the 
independent ROI in left anterior insula when subjects witnessed high versus low pain in the 
ingroup member compared to high versus low pain in the outgroup member in Session 1 and 
individual differences in helping the ingroup compared to the outgroup member (in relation to 
the total frequency of helping) in Session 2. IG = ingroup; OG = outgroup.  
 
Figure 3. Correlations between brain activation when witnessing outgroup members suffering 
pain and individual differences on a self-report impression scale as well as in outgroup 
helping. A) Correlation between individual parameter estimates extracted from an 
independent ROI in right nucleus accumbens (NAcc) when subjects witnessed high versus 
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low pain in the outgroup member in Session 1 and individual differences in outgroup ratings 
on the Impression Scale (Batson et al. 1988); B) Correlation between individual parameter 
estimates extracted from the independent ROI in left anterior insula when subjects witnessed 
high versus low pain in the outgroup member in Session 1 and individual differences in 
outgroup ratings on the Impression Scale; C) Correlation between individual parameter 
estimates extracted from an independent ROI in right nucleus accumbens (NAcc) when 
subjects witnessed high versus low pain in the outgroup member in Session 1 and individual 
differences in the frequency of outgroup helping in Session 2.  
 32
Reference List 
 
Akitsuki,Y., and Decety, J. (2009). Social context and perceived agency affects empathy for 
pain: an event-related fMRI investigation. Neuroimage 47, 722-734. 
Batson, C.D. (1991). The altruism question: Toward a social-psychological answer (Hillsdale, 
NJ: Erlbaum.). 
Batson, C.D., Eklund, J.H., Chermok,V.L., Hoyt, J.L., and Ortiz, B.G. (2007). An additional 
antecedent of empathic concern: valuing the welfare of the person in need. J Pers Soc Psychol 
93, 65-74. 
Batson, C.D., Dyck, J., Brandt, J., Batson, J., Powell, A., McMaster, M., and Griffitt, C. 
(1988). Five studies testing two new egoistic alternatives to the empathy-altruism hypothesis. 
J Pers SocPsychol 55, 52-77. 
Batson, C.D., Early, S., and Salvarini, G. (1997). Perspective taking: imagining how another 
feels versus imagining how you would feel. Pers Soc Psychol Bull 23, 751-758. 
Batson,C.D., O'Quin, K., Fultz, J., Vanderplas, M., and Isen, A.M. (1983). Influence of self-
reported distress and empathy on egoistic versus altruistic motivation to help. J Pers Soc 
Psychol 45, 706-718. 
Benuzzi, F., Lui, F., Duzzi, D., Nichelli, P.F., and Porro, C.A. (2008). Does it look painful or 
disgusting? Ask your parietal and cingulate cortex. J Neurosci 28, 923-931. 
Bird,G., Silani,G., White,S., Frith,U., and Singer,T. (2009). Empathic brain responses in 
insula are modulated by levels of alexithymia but not autism. Brain 133, 1515-1525. 
Brett, M., Anton, J., Valabregue, R., and Poline, J. (2009). Region of interest analysis using 
an SPM toolbox. Neuroimage 16, 2.  
 
Cheng, Y., Lin, C.P., Liu, H.L., Hsu, Y.Y., Lim, K.E., Hung, D., and Decety, J. (2007). 
Expertise modulates the perception of pain in others. Curr. Biol 17, 1708-1713. 
Coke, J., Batson, C.D., and McDavis, K. (1978). Empathic mediation of helping: A two-stage 
model. J Pers Soc Psychol 36, 752-766. 
Davison, A., and Hinkley, D. (1997). Bootstrap methods and their application (Cambridge 
University Press). 
De Dreu, C.K., Greer, L.L., Handgraaf, M.J., Shalvi, S., Van Kleef, G.A., Baas, M., Ten 
Velden, F.S., Van, D.E., and Feith, S.W. (2010). The neuropeptide oxytocin regulates 
parochial altruism in intergroup conflict among humans. Science 328, 1408-1411. 
Decety, J., and Lamm, C. (2006). Human empathy through the lens of social neuroscience. 
Sci World J 6, 1146-1163. 
Dovidio, J., Allen, J., and Schroeder, D. (1990). The specificity of empathy-induced helping: 
evidence for altruistic motivation. J Pers Soc Psychol 59, 249-260. 
 33
Dovidio, J., Piliavin, J., Schroeder, D., and Penner, L. (2006). The social psychology of 
prosocial behavior (Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc.). 
Eisenberg, N., Fabes, R.A., Miller, P.A., Fultz, J., Shell, R., Mathy, R.M., and Reno, R.R. 
(1989). Relation of sympathy and personal distress to prosocial behavior: a multimethod 
study. J Pers. Soc Psychol 57, 55-66. 
Friston, K., Ashburner, J., Frith, C., Heather, J., and Frackowiak, R. (2009). Spatial 
registration and normalization of images. Hum Brain Mapp 2, 189. 
Friston, K., Holmes, A., Worsley, K., Poline, J., Frith, C., and Frackowiak, R. (1995). 
Statistical parametric maps in functional imaging: a general linear approach. Hum Brain 
Mapp 2, 210. 
Golby, A.J., Gabrieli, J.D., Chiao, J.Y., and Eberhardt, J.L. (2001). Differential responses in 
the fusiform region to same-race and other-race faces. Nat Neurosci 4, 845-850. 
Greenwald, A., and Banaji, M. (1995). Implicit social cognition: Attitudes, self-esteem, and 
stereotypes. Psychol Review 102, 4-27. 
Hein, G., and Singer, T. (2008). I feel how you feel but not always: the empathic brain and its 
modulation. Curr. Opin. Neurobiol 18, 153-158. 
Henson, R.N., Price, C.J., Rugg, M.D., Turner, R., and Friston, K.J. (2002). Detecting latency 
differences in event-related BOLD responses: application to words versus nonwords and 
initial versus repeated face presentations. Neuroimage 15, 83-97. 
Horn, J. (1965). A rationale and test for the number of factors in factor analysis. 
Psychometrika 30, 179-185. 
Jackson, P.L., Brunet, E., Meltzoff, A.N., and Decety, J. (2005). Empathy examined through 
the neural mechanisms involved in imagining how I feel versus how you feel pain. 
Neuropsychologia 44, 752-761 . 
Josephs, O., Turner, R., and Friston, K. (1997). Event-related fMRI. Hum Brain Mapp 5, 243-
248. 
Kawakami, K., Dunn, E., Karmali, F., and Dovidio, J.F. (2009). Mispredicting affective and 
behavioral responses to racism. Science 323, 276-278. 
Keller, T., Popovic, M., Pappas, I., and Müller, P. Functional electrical stimulator compex 
motion. [International workshop on functional electrical stimulation.], 22-25. 2001.  
 
Knutson, B., Wimmer, G.E., Rick, S., Hollon, N.G., Prelec, D., and Loewenstein, G. (2008). 
Neural antecedents of the endowment effect. Neuron 58, 814-822. 
Kriegeskorte, N., Simmons, W.K., Bellgowan, P.S., and Baker, C.I. (2009). Circular analysis 
in systems neuroscience: the dangers of double dipping. Nat. Neurosci 12, 535-540. 
Lamm, C., and Singer, T. (2010). The role of anterior insular cortex in social emotions. Brain 
Struct Funct, 214, 579-591.  
 
 34
Lamm, C., Batson, C.D., and Decety, J. (2007a). The Neural Substrate of Human Empathy: 
Effects of Perspective-taking and Cognitive Appraisal. J Cogn Neurosci 19, 42-58. 
Lamm, C., Nusbaum, H.C., Meltzoff, A.N., and Decety, J. (2007b). What are you feeling? 
Using functional magnetic resonance imaging to assess the modulation of sensory and 
affective responses during empathy for pain. PLoS One 2, e1292. 
Levine, M., Prosser, A., Evans, D., and Reicher, S. (2005). Identity and emergency 
intervention: how social group membership and inclusiveness of group boundaries shape 
helping behavior. Pers Soc Psychol Bull 31, 443-453. 
Lieberman, M.D., Hariri, A., Jarcho, J.M., Eisenberger, N.I., and Bookheimer, S.Y. (2005). 
An fMRI investigation of race-related amygdala activity in African-American and Caucasian-
American individuals. Nat. Neurosci 8, 720-722. 
Nimon, K., Lewis, M., Kane, R., and Haynes, R. (2008). An R package to compute 
commonality coefficients in the multiple regression case: an introduction to the package and a 
practical example. Behav Res Methods 40, 457-466. 
Olsson, A., Ebert, J.P., Banaji, M.R., and Phelps, E.A. (2005). The role of social groups in the 
persistence of learned fear. Science 309, 785-787. 
Pedhazur,E. (1997). Multiple regression in behavioral research: Explanation and prediction. 
Stanford, CT: Thomson Learning.). 
Penner, L.A., Dovidio, J.F., Piliavin, J.A., and Schroeder, D.A. (2005). Prosocial behavior: 
multilevel perspectives. Annu. Rev. Psychol 56, 365-392. 
Penny, W., and Holmes, A. (2004). Random-effects analysis. In Human brain function, W. 
Penny, A. Holmes, and K.J. Friston, eds. (Elsevier, San Diego.), pp. 843-850. 
Pruessmann, K., Weiger, M., Scheidegger, M., and Boesiger, P. (1999). SENSE: sensitivity 
encoding for fast MRI. Magn Reson Med 42, 952-962. 
Romano, J., and Wolf, M. (2005). Stepwise multiple testing as formalized data snooping. 
Econometrica 73, 1237-1282. 
Saarela, M.V., Hlushchuk, Y., Williams, A.C., Schurmann, M., Kalso, E., and Hari, R. 
(2007). The compassionate brain: humans detect intensity of pain from another's face. Cereb. 
Cortex 17, 230-237. 
Schultz, W. (1986). Responses of midbrain dopamine neurons to behavioral trigger stimuli in 
the monkey. J Neurophysiol 56, 1439-1461. 
Schultz,W. (2000). Multiple reward signals in the brain. Nat. Rev. Neurosci 1, 199-207. 
Schultz,W. (2002). Getting formal with dopamine and reward. Neuron 36, 241-263. 
Singer, T., and Lamm, C. (2009). The social neuroscience of empathy. Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sci 
1156, 81-96. 
 35
Singer, T., Seymour, B., O'Doherty, J., Kaube, H., Dolan, R.J., and Frith, C.D. (2004). 
Empathy for pain involves the affective but not sensory components of pain. Science 303, 
1157-1162. 
Singer, T., Seymour, B., O'Doherty, J.P., Stephan, K.E., Dolan, R.J., and Frith, C.D. (2006). 
Empathic neural responses are modulated by the perceived fairness of others. Nature 439, 
466-469. 
Singer, T., Snozzi, R., Bird, G., Petrovic, P., Silani, G., Heinrichs, M., and Dolan, R.J. (2008). 
Effects of oxytocin and prosocial behavior on brain responses to direct and vicariously 
experienced pain. Emotion 8, 781-791. 
Stürmer, S., Snyder, M., and Omoto, A. (2005). Prosocial emotions and helping: the 
moderating role of group membership. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol 88, 532-546. 
Stürmer, S., Snyder, M., Kropp, A., and Siem, B. (2006). Empathy-motivated helping: the 
moderating role of group membership. Pers Soc Psychol Bull 32, 943-956. 
Takahashi, H., Kato, M., Matsuura, M., Mobbs, D., Suhara, T., and Okubo, Y. (2009). When 
your gain is my pain and your pain is my gain: neural correlates of envy and schadenfreude. 
Science 323, 937-939. 
Van Bavel, J.J., Packer, D.J., and Cunningham, W.A. (2008). The neural substrates of in-
group bias: a functional magnetic resonance imaging investigation. Psychol Sci 19, 1131-
1139. 
Wann, D., and Branscombe, N. (1993). Sports fans: measuring degree of identification with 
the team. Int J Sport Psychol 24, 1-17. 
Xu, X., Zuo, X., Wang, X., and Han, S. (2009). Do you feel my pain? Racial group 
membership modulates empathic neural responses. J. Neurosci 29, 8525-8529. 
 
 36



